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DIGITIZED PORNOGRAPHY
MEETS THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Eric M. Freedman*

As the professor on the panel, I feel that I should start by
putting our subject into a bit of context. Then I will focus on the

criminalization of depictions of imaginary children before saying a
few words about the overbreadth of this statute.
By way of context, then, the problem that we are discussing is
one that is characteristic of the introduction of new

communications technologies.
At the end of the nineteenth century, when movies were first
shown, people came running out of the theaters in panic when they

saw a picture of a locomotive bearing down upon them-the effect
was that intense.' As a result, in 1915 the United States Supreme
Court said that movies are not protected, because they are

something different, a dangerous form of expression, and not the
newspapers, which the Framers had in mind.' But in 1952, the

Court had to overrule that case, with some embarrassment,3
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3 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
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because by then movies had been incorporated into society and
the initial hysteria had died. There are many more examples along
those lines,' which simply reflect the reality that new
communications modalities succeed exactly because they produce
more dramatic, more vivid, and more realistic representations than
the ones that could previously be created. A photograph is truer
to life than a painting, which is why there developed a market for
photographs, and movies displaced magic lantern shows for the
same reason.
Furthermore, the hysteria problem is exacerbated because
almost invariably one of the first uses of a new communications
technique is to spread political dissent and sexual imagery.' This is
a phenomenon that has been with us for centuries, but one that
still gets governments very upset,6 particularly because the early
innovators tend to be the younger, more iconoclastic members of
society, who are just the ones that make incumbent power-holders
uneasy.
With that background, let's try to step back a bit and consider
whether the First Amendment will survive the invention of the
computer by looking at the various justifications that have been
offered for a statute that criminalizes purely digital depictions.
These are pixelized pixies. They are nothing more or less than
images created by a more vivid communications technology than
previously existed-images that some of our panelists really don't
like.
Well that, too, is usual in First Amendment discussions. The
single most common comment from someone advocating
suppression of a particular communication is, "No one is a greater
supporter of the First Amendment than I am. But this particular
material under discussion simply doesn't deserve First
Amendment protection." The appropriate answer to that is: "Why
not?" Precisely because the First Amendment is designed to
protect the unpopular message, the one whose dissemination
would never carry if put to a vote, the burden is never on the
speaker to explain the social value of the speech but always on the
state to justify its suppression.
So before we get to child pornography and to this statute in
particular, let us look at the state's justifications for the
suppression of obscenity generally.7 Both the oldest and the
4 See Freedman, Remove the Lens Cap, supra note *, at 956-69 (providing numerous
instances).
5 See id. at 959 n.369.
6 See id. at 960 n.377.
7 For an extended formal treatment of this subject, see id. at 894-924.
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newest interest asserted is simple thought control. In the original
religious settlements of New England, if you indulged in
unorthodox speech, reflecting unorthodox thinking, you not only
endangered your own welfare-you were going to Hell foreverbut, more critically, you put the entire community at the same
risk.8
This thought control purpose still survives in some quarters.
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, for instance, have
been leaders in arguing that the First Amendment should not
protect "pornography," broadly defined, 9 because pornography
teaches by its content and demonstrates by its very existence that
women are not full members of the community. 10 However, as the
Seventh Circuit correctly ruled in invalidating an Indianapolis
ordinance based on this theory, "the state may not ordain
preferred viewpoints.""
Thought control is not a legitimate First Amendment purpose
even if-perhaps especially if-the thoughts are ones that the
majority considers socially undesirable, as was true, for instance in
the very recent past of beliefs in the propriety of homosexual
conduct and interracial marriage. For example, when D.H.
Lawrence's work Lady Chatterly's Lover, 2 which concerns a
woman who has an inadequate husband and finds satisfaction with
a gamekeeper, was made into a movie, the State of New York
sought to ban it. 3 The government's rationale was that the
"presentation of adultery as a desirable, acceptable and proper
pattern of behavior" was "contrary to the moral standards, the
religious precepts and the legal code of its citizenry." 4
Invalidating the state's effort as a violation of the First
Amendment, Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the Court,
t]his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution
protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be
8 See Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391, 395 (1963) (commenting that obscenity is suppressed "for the purity of the
community and for the salvation and welfare of the 'consumer.' Obscenity, at bottom, is
not crime. Obscenity is sin.").
9 For a discussion of this definitional issue, see Freedman, Remove the Lens Cap,
supra note *,at 934.
10 See id. at 931-32.
" Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 352 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem.,

475 U.S. 1001 (1985).

12 D.H. LAWRENCE,

LADY CHATTERLY'S LOVER (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993)

(1928).
13

See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).

14 Id. at

688-89, 695.
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proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax.
And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is
eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.15
So the argument that pedophiles should not be thinking that
sexual conduct with children is acceptable behavior 16 is simply
contrary to the First Amendment. For that reason, you get people
like our two defenders of the Act here tonight conceding that
point but defending the statute on the basis that this particular
material will incite people to commit misconduct, whether direct
sexual assaults or the seduction of children." But there is a very
long history of the First Amendment getting more and more
stringent with respect to the justification that some communication
will lead the hearers to behave in an antisocial manner, because
that argument has been so often misused in political contexts."
Thus, in 1969 in Brandenburg v. Ohio,19 the Court held that the
government could only suppress speech on this basis if it proved
that the communication is "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." 0 That case built upon a number of basic principles.
One of these, which is especially applicable to our discussion
here tonight comes from Butler v. Michigan,2 which struck down a
law aimed at violent comic books because they were publications
"manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth."22
The law in Butler violated the First Amendment, Justice
Frankfurter wrote, because, "[t]he incidence of this enactment is to
15 Id. at 688-89; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1399 (citing
this case and its re-iteration

of the words of Justice Brandeis quoted infra text

accompanying note 25).
16 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 300926, § 1(4) (viewing "sexually explicit" images of juveniles "can desensitize the viewer to
the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable
to and even preferred by the viewer"); see also id. at § 121(11)(B) (adding that such

images create an unwholesome moral environment).
17 See Panel Discussion, The Fate of the Child PornographyAct of 1996, at 8 (Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law, May 1, 2001) (on file with CARDOZO L. REV.) [hereinafter

Panel Transcript] ("I don't think there is any reasonable argument that can be mustered
that would contest the fact that the pedophile community, the preferential and situational
offenders use child pornography to seduce and coerece real children."); id. at 11 ("The
Ninth Circuit failed to ... find a link between visual depictions of child pornography in

how the pedophile community and situational and preferential offenders abuse children.
We think that that's wrong."); see also id. at 40 ("In enacting the CPPA, Congress found
that virtual child pornography serves as a catalyst that stimulates . . . and 'inflames
pedophiles into sexual abuse of children,' by 'whetting their own sexual appetite and as a
model for sexual acting out with children."').
"8 See Freedman, Remove the Lens Cap, supra note *, at 906-11.
19 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
20
21
22

Id. at 447; see Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1403 (relying upon this passage).
352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Id. at 381 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.343 (repealed 1957)).
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reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit
for children."23 So too, even if some pedophile might be inflamed
by child pornography, one has to base one's enactments on a
reasonable viewer 24 or you will reduce the entire population of the
country to viewing what is only fit for child molesters.
As Justice Brandeis said, "[a]mong free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and
punishment for violations of the law, not abridgement of the rights
of free speech and assembly."' 5 If after viewing the material
covered by the law someone goes out and commits a crime like
some of the horrendous ones that Mr. Amar describes, 26 arrest the
criminal, not the creator or distributor of the material. Unless the
circumstances are such that a reasonable person would not engage
in deliberation before acting (as upon hearing a cry of fire in 'a
crowded theater), people should not be shielded from information
27
by a paternalistic state which fears that they will misuse it.
In response to all of this, you have heard a lot about New
York v. Ferber." In that case, the Supreme Court endorsed
suppression of a broad range of "child pornography" for the
following reasons.
First, the state's interest was not in preventing the public
from viewing the material, but rather in protecting children from
being used in its production, and "t]he prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse of children29 constitutes a government
objective of surpassing importance.

Second, a ban on the distribution of materials depicting sexual
activity by juveniles furthers this interest because (a) "the
materials produced are a permanent record of the children's
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation," and (b) "the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which requires the
sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled."30
23 Id. at 383; see Aschcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1402-03 (relying on this passage).
24 If the rule were otherwise the result would be to ban a huge range of mainstream
works, including the Bible and Disney movies. See Freedman, Remove the Lens Cap,
supra note *, at 909 n.125
25 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
26 See Panel Transcript, supra note 17, at 63.
27 See Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.

748, 769-70 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment precludes the state from the "highly
paternalistic approach" of forbidding a speaker to provide information on the ground that
the recipient will misuse it).
2 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For a detailed consideration of the case, see Freedman,
Remove the Lens Cap, supra note *, at 925-30.
29 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
30 Id. at 759.
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Of course none of these justifications apply to purely
imaginary children, and the depiction of those is protected by the
First Amendment. The support for this proposition comes from
Ferber itself, where the Court noted that little or no
communication was being suppressed because creators could use
over-age actors who looked younger, or simulate the scenes.31
That means that the argument you just heard from Mr. Amar 2
that the FerberCourt didn't anticipate today's realistic simulations,
is just wrong. One key reason the Court upheld that statute was
because creators would still be able produce works
indistinguishable from ones employing actual children.
So what Mr. McCarthy describes as a "loophole," namely that
one can use computer technology to make "images [that] are
indistinguishable from photographs of real children, '33 isn't a
loophole at all. It's a requirement of any statute that is going to
meet the First Amendment.
Therefore, the proponents of the statute are correct in saying
that the government is going to have to prove in any criminal
prosecution that real children were used. But so what? Legally,
it's hardly a constitutionally acceptable response to the
government's inability to bear the burden of proof in a criminal
case to pass a statute relieving it of the need to do so. 34 As a
practical matter, all that this means is that, in the extremely few
cases that go to trial, the government will need an inside witness,
as it frequently does in Mafia cases.
Turning to my last subject, the statute is also flawed because it
covers all images that "appear to be" ones of children engaging in
"sexually explicit" conduct.35 Now this has two basic problems.
First of all, it includes all sorts of works of art, like cartoons or
cherubs cavorting at the edges of paintings, that appear to be
images of such conduct because that is precisely what they are,
although presumably the statute isn't aimed at them.36
31 See id. at 763; see Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. at 1411 (citing this passage).
32

Panel Transcript, supranote 17, at 12.

33 Id. at 28-29.
34 Cf Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. at 1404 ("The argument, in essence, is that protected speech

may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This analysis turns the First
Amendment upside down.... Protected speech does not become unprotected merely
because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse.").
35 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26, §
121(2)(4).
36 This point was of repeated concern to the Justices during the oral argument of
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition on October 31, 2001, where there was much discussion
of such mainstream movies as THE TIN DRUM (Warner Bros. 1979), TRAFFIC (USA Films
2000), and ROMEO AND JULIET (Paramount 1968), all of which contain scenes depicting

sexual activity by persons under the age of 18, which are presumably designed to be as
realistic as possible. Record of Oral Argument at 10-13, 31-32, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
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Instead, the purpose of the statute seems to be to proscribe
any image that is so closely indistinguishable from one of a real
juvenile engaging in sexual activity that a reasonable person could
not tell that it is not.37 Well that certainly raises a second problem;
as the Ninth Circuit correctly suggested, a statute written in those
terms would be hopelessly vague. Nor is it reassuring to be told by
Mr. Amar that we'll just rely on the good sense of the jury to
determine whether or not the challenged image is or is not
"virtually indistinguishable." 8
In conclusion, I certainly hope that the Supreme Court will
overturn the statute. After all, the whole point of the First
Amendment is to preserve the possibilities of the future by
denying the majority the right to suppress speech it finds hateful in
the present.

Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (No. 00-795) [hereinafter Ashcroft Record], available at
2001 WL 1398602, The ultimate decision reiterated these examples, see Ashcroft, 122 S.
Ct. at 1400, to support its conclusion that the statute "proscribes the visual depiction of an
idea." Id.
37 In fact, the government on argument in the Supreme Court stated that "appears to
be" should only "cover images that are virtually indistinguishable from traditional child
pornography." Ashcroft Record, supra note 36, at 28.
38 Panel Transcript, supra note 17, at 66.

